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An Argument Against Monetary Independence
in a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
Walter Enders*
Proponents of flexible exchange rates have long claimed that one of
the main advantages of a flexible exchange rate regime is that It allows
a nation to pursue an Independent monetary policy. Under a system of
fixed exchange rates, the actions of the domestic monetary authorities are
limited by their ability to finance a balance of payments deficit. Whether
a nation is small (in the sense that its monetary authorities cannot control
the nominal money supply) or large (in the sense that its actions can affect
the world money supply) fixed exchange rates prevent the domestic monetary
authorities from continually expanding the domestic component of the money
supply at a rate greater than the rate of growth of the demand for domestic
money. As a flexible exchange rate eliminates the reserve constraint, It
also gives the domestic monetary authorities control over the domestic
money supply. Yet the term "independent monetary policy" connotes more
than sinqple control over the nominal money supply. One such connotation is
that disturbances in the domestic money market are Isolated from disturbances
in the foreign money market.—^ Asecond^ and more important, connotation
Is that the domestic monetary authorities can set an inflation rate which
differs from the foreign Inflation rate(s). The purpose of this paper is
to show that If the term "monetary Independence" is supposed to imply the
independence of money markets or inflation rates, then a flexible exchange
rate regime will not allow nations to pursue Independent monetary policies.
Instead, it will be shown that under a system of flexible exchange rates,
the domestic inflation rate will be dependent upon changes in the foreign
money market. Not only will it be shown that monetary actions of one
government act to change both the domestic and foreign inflation rate, it
will also be shown that in certain reasonable circumstances the domestic
and foreign inflation rate must be equal.
In standard international macroeconomic models it is commonly assumed
that domestic residents only hold domestic money. This assus^tion is
analytically useful for under such conditions it is possible to identify
the Official Reserve Transactions Balance as one source of change in a
nation's money supply. Yet sin^lifying assumptions necessarily entail
costs as well as benefits. On the cost side, the assumption that domestic
residents only hold domestic money necessitates abstracting from the capital
gains or losses on domestic holdings of foreign money balances which arise
whenever exchange rates change. As the capital gains and losses on domestic
holdings of foreign bonds which arise from exchange rate changes are
typically deemed important, there seems to be a fundamental asymmetry in
models which assume that domestics! ;hold foreign bonds but not foreign money.—^
While the official demand for foreign money balances would be greater
with fixed, as compared to flexible, exchange rates, the private demand for
foreign money balances would be greater with flexible exchange rates.—^
Motives for such holdings naturally Include those of portfolio diversi
fication and reduced transaction costs. While the data concerning private
inter-country money holdings is scanty, the sizes of the Euro-Swiss Franc,
Euro-Deutsche Mark, Euro-Guilder and Euro-Dollar markets suggest that such
currency holdings should be large. For as Guilders held in the Euro-
Guilder market are in^erfect substitutes for Guilder deposits in the
Netherlands, the recent growth of the various Euro-markets suggests that
the magnitude of total inter-country money holdings should be sizable.
In recent paper with Professor Lapan,—^ we demonstrated that
domestic holdings of foreign money acts to reduce the efficacy of a
devaluation. The model used in that paper, however, is not entirely
suitable to analyze a system of flexible exchange rates for it assumes
that individuals do not anticipate price or exchange rate changes. In
the section below, the aforementioned model will be modified to allow
for anticipations of price and exchange rate changes. It will then be
shown that whenever domestic residents hold foreign monies, inflation
rates must be linked.
The Model
The model postulates a two country--say the U.S. and U.K.--one
commodity world in which there is free trade. In order to highlight the
interdependence of inflation rates, the simplest financial structure will
be postulated. As such, it is assumed that monies are the only marketable
assets and that residents of each country desire to hold the foreign
money. It is further assumed that exchange rates are flexible and that
Individuals chose the mix of assets within their portfolios based upon
real rates of return. The deposit rate on money is set equal to zero so
that the real rate of return on dollars to U.S. asset holders will be
minus one times the U.S. Inflation rate. Correspondingly, the real rate
of return on pounds, to U.K. residents, will be minus one multiplied by
the U.K. inflation rate. -U.S. residents holding pounds will earn a
nominal rate of return equal to the rate of appreciation of the pound.
In real terms, the rate of return on pounds to U.S. residents will be
the rate of appreciation of the pound minus the U.S. inflation rate.
U.K. residents holding dollars will receive a nominal rate of return
equal to minus one times the rate of appreciation of the pound, and a
real rate of return equal to the nominal rate of return minus the U.K.
inflation rate. Thus:
= -TT WHERE: r ' (r_. ® real rate of return onU.fa. U.K.. dollars to U.S. (U.K.)
= g - tt residents
r' - V ^ ° real rate of return on
= -g^ - TT* ' * * ' pounds to U.S. (U.K.)
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® -"T' n « U.Si inflation rate
tt' = U.K. inflation rate
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the pound
In this one good world, commodity arbitrage will ensure P = eP' so that:
5) TT = + n' and: P (P') = dollar (pound) price of commodities
Substituting equation 3 into equations 2 and 3, it is immediately seen
that the real rate of return on dollars to both U.S. and U.K. residents is
-n, and that the real rate of pounds to both U.S. and U.K. residents is -tt'^
As real income is assumed constant, the U.S. (U.K^ demands for real
assets can be expressed solely as a function of their real rates of return.
In the absence of money illusion, nominal asset demands will be homogeneous
of degree one in terms of the domestic price level:
6) = PL(tt, tt') WHERE: . M° (M^°) = U.S. (U.K.) demand for
n dollarsZ'
7) eM- =PL'(tt. tt') d FD
T|«T) p M' (M' ) = U.S. 4U*K.) demand for
8) n = eP'L (n, tt') pounds
Qv w,FD i\ j 2>L' 2)L'^9) M - P L (tt, TT ) and! are negative
SL aL'
a^?-' a^T' positive.
Thus, the total demand for dollars and pounds can be represented by:^
10) D = PF(tt, tt') WHERE: D = total demand for dollars
D' a total demand for pounds
11) D« = P-F'(tt, n') F = L+ L^





As the two money markets are linked and the real rates of return are
the two inflation rates, it is relatively simple to show that the two
inflation rates must be linked. This can be done by logarithmically
differentiating equations 10 and 11 with respect to time:
10') gjj =TT + Sx ~ of growth of variable X=^ ^
11') gj,, = n' + Tl{g^ + T)^g^,
% Stt F' VJtt' F' J
these elastlcites are assumed to be
constant
and: <0, ^12 > TI2 < ^
From equation 10' (11*) it is seen that whenever the U.K. (U.S.)
inflation rate Is changing, the rate of growth of the U.S. (U.K.) demand
for money will be affected. If the market for dollars is initially in
equilibrium with the U.S. inflation rate equal to the rate of growth of the
supply of dollars, a changing U.K. inflation rate will iresult
in a discrepancy between the demand and supply of dollars. Without a
change in the rate of growth of the supply of ilollars, equilibrium in the
market for dollars can only be restored by a changing U.S. inflation rate.
It is well known that setting equations of the form 10' and 11' equal
to the corresponding rates of growth of the money supply will lead to
9/
instability.— Fori'stability, prices must respond to monetary growth with
a lag. One reasonable dynamic postulate is that g (g ,) is proportional
TT TT
to the rate of growth of the supply of dollars (pounds) minus the rate of
growth of the demand for dollars (pounds)^ Setting these constants of
proportionality equal to unity:
12) := ^ _ "pj^g^ - ^128^1 WHERE: g^ ~ rate of growth of
the supply of dollars
®tt' " ®m' • " TI28 I (pounds)
Rearranging and substitution yields:
(1 + Tip (8a - ") - Tl2[Sm. -
12') 2 =
" , (1 + Hi + 112 + " •'li'np
13') ill = (1 + V(gm'-
" (1 + + Tl' + Tl^Tl' - T\[\)
From equations 12' and 13' it is Immediately seen that long run equilibrium
requires = tt and n'. Thus, if the system is stable, £he monetary
authorities can attain independent inflation rates in the long run. In the
short run, or if the system is unstable, inflation rates will be inter
dependent. In the standard case, in which domestics only hold domestic
currency (y\^ = s= o) , equations 12' and l3' can be solved independently.
As such, the domestic Inflation rate will be independent of the foreign rate, and
each equation will converge if the inflation rate elasticity of the demand
for dollars (pounds) is greater than minus one. When assets are imperfect
substitutes, the two inflation rates will be linked and overall stability
of the system will depend upon the magnitudes of both the direct and cross
interest rate elasticities. As many combinations are possible, and as
the purpose of this paper is to examine the Interdependence of inflation
rates, sufficient conditions for stability will be postulated. The
system will always converge to equilibrium ifjf the following three conditions
hold:
a) 1 + 7]^ > 0
b) 1 + 71^ > 0
<=) 1 - Tl{Tl2 > 0
Given these conditions, it is possible to determine the time path of
the system. The loci of points for which f and n' are zero are given by
equations 14 and 15 respectively:
Sn. - " - (Sn.- - °
"Hi
13) g^, - n' - ^ ^
These two loci are plotted In figure 1 as AA and BB respectively. AA
is positively sloped as condition (b) guarantees (1 + 11^/712 positive,
and BB is positively sloped as condition (a) guarantees Tl|/(1 + Tl^^) is
positive. Condition (c) guarantees that the slope of AA is greater than the
slope of BB: thus condition (c) ensures that the demand for pounds is
relatively more sensitive to the U.K. inflation rate (as compared to the
U.S. rate) than in the demand for dollars,—^
IT
(8„ - tt') = 0
Figure 1
Conditions b and c, together with equation 12' ensure that the U.S.
inflation rate will rise at all points to the left and above the AA locus
and fall at all points to the right and below the AA locus. In the same
manner, conditions (a) and (c), together with equation 13*, ensure that the
U.K. Inflation rate will fall at all points to the left and above the BB
locus and rise at all points to the right and below the BB locus. Given
these conditions the system will be cyclically stable as at least one vector
always moves the system towards equilibirum.
The iiiq>ortant point, however, is that the inflation rates are inter
dependent. Consider the case in which the two money supplies and inflation
rates are all growing at the same rate. Let these be a shock to the system
such that the rate of growth of the U.S. money supply increases but the
rate of growth of the U.K. money supply remains unchanged. Thus, the
initial conditions will be such that the U.S. inflation rate is less than
the long run equilibrium rate, while the U.K. Inflation rate is consistent
with long run equilibrium (point 1 in figure 1). With g > rr and g , » n*,
m m
equation 12* shows that the U.S. inflation rate will begin to Increase.
The U.K. Inflation rate will not remain constant for as the U.S. Inflation
rate Increases, asset holders will atteiz^>t to substitute pounds for their
dollar holdings. The increase in the demand for pounds will mean that the
rate of growth of the U.K. money supply is now less than the rate of growth
of the demand for pounds. Under these conditions, equation 13 demonstrates
that the U.K. inflation rate will begin to decrease. This process can be
explained in a somewhat more intuitive way if the role of commodity
arbiters is considered. When the asset holders attempt to substitute
pounds for dollars, upward pressure is put on the pound. The pound,
however, cannot appreciate by more than the disparity between inflation
rates. Instead, the additional upward pressure on the pound will induce
connaodlty arbiters to purchase U.S. as opposed to U.K. goods. This action
will lead to a greater U.S. inflation rate and a reduction in the U.K.
inflation rate.
9The point is that inflation rates must be linked. As a change in a
nation's inflation rate will alter the rate of return on that nation's
currency, it will induce a change in desired portfolio composition. As
long as different currencies are viewed as substitutes, a change in the
demand for one nation's currency will result in a change in the demand
for the other. As such, the real rates of return on currencies (inflation
rates) must be linked. This point can be made most dramatically in the
special case in which the two monies are viewed as perfect substitutes.
In this special case, equilibrium in the asset markets will require the
two rates of return to be equal, i.e., equilibrium requires that tt = tt'.
In this case, then, governments will not be able to pursue independent
inflation rates, even in the long run. Thus, while flexible exchange
rates eliminate the reserve constraint, the monetary authorities will not
be able to pursue Independent inflation rates, even in the long run. In
terms of the dynamic structure given by equations 12 and 13, the assuiiq>tion
that the two !iK>nies are perfect substitutes will lead to an unstable system.
Under such conditions the monetary authorities in each country would be
forced to agree on a common inflation rate. Yet, if an alternative dynamic
structure is postulated for which the system is stable, the two inflation
rates would still necessarily be equal. The properties of a flexible exchange
rate system would be identical to that of a fixed rate system, i.e., equal
rates of inflation.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that it is important to consider the effects of
domestic holdings of foreign currencies in assessing the benefits of a
flexible exchange rate system. The simplest possible model was postulated
which den^nstrated that inflation rates under flexible exchange rates are
not independent when domestics hold foreign currency. In postulating a
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single model, however, several important questions have been overlooked.
In particular, it is of interest to know how the presence of a bond market,
and the existance of more than one good would affect the results presented
above. The model presented considered two large countries. It would also
be of interest, however, to examine a small country model. When foreign
residents hold domestic currency, the monetary authorities in a small
country do not have complete control over the domestic money supply
when money is defined as in Burger and Balb^ch (1972).
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Footnotes
* Assistant Professor of Economics, Iowa State University. The author
is grateful to Dennis Starleaf and Roy Gardner for their comments on
the ideas presented in this paper.
1. Mathieson (1976) considers the effects of foreign monetary expansion
on the domestic inflation rate in a model in which individuals do not
fully anticipate exchange rate changes. He finds that countries will
have independent inflation rates.if individuals do fully anticipate
such changes. In the model developed below, it will be assumed that
the expected and actual inflation rates are equal.
2. For example, in Mathieson (1976) the domestic rate of interest is
equal to the foreign interest rate plus the rate of appreciation
of the foreign currency. A similar relationship should hold for
real rates of return on monies.
3. See McKinnon (1969), Machlup (1964) pp. 267-76, or Mikesell and
Furth (1974) concerning the motives for holding foreign money balances
under a flexible exchange rate regime.
4. . Mikesell and Furth (1974) make a similar point on page 62.
5. See Lapan and Enders (1976).
6. Consider a U.S. resident holding a pound when the exchange rate is
initially $1/1&. If at the end of one year the U.S. resident decides
to purchase U.K. goods, the real value of the pound will be -n'.
Alternatively, the U.S. resident can purchase goods in the U.S. at the
end of the year. In dollar tems, the pound will yield (1 + g )
dollars. In real terms, these dollars will be worth (1 + g^ - tt) =
(1 TT*) dollars. Thus, the real rate of return on pound holdings
to U.S. residents will always be -tt' which is equal to the real rate
of return on pounds to U.K. residents.
7. Note that and M^^ are denominated in terms of dollars and M'^
and M'^^ are denominated in pounds. Thus, is the dollar value
of the pounds demanded by U.S: residents and M^^/e is the pound
value of 'dollar demoded by U.K. residents.
8. Equations 10 and 11 make use of the fact that F ~ eP*.
9. Consider the simple model: M = PL(n) where; M = money supply. Thus:
= TT + TT^ir/rr where: T] dn/dt. So that:
TT = (gjj^ - n)TT/Tl • Consider the initial g > n > 0. Under these
circumstances fr^is negative. Thus, prices nuist respond to monetary
growth with a lag.
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10. As only positive inflation rates will be considered there will he no
qualitative difference between this assumption and the assumption
that the change in the inflation rate is proportional to the discrepancy
between the rate of growth of the money supply and money demanded.
Either dynamic assun^tion can be defended in several ways. If the U.S.
money supply is growing faster than the demand, dollar holders will
attempt to substitute pounds for dollars In their portfolios. This
desired change in asset conqsosition will put upward pressure on the
pound. Without a change in inflation rates the pound cannot appreciate,
but the upward pressure on the pound will induce commodity arbiters to
purchase U.S. goods. Thus, dollar prices will rise if the rate of
growth of dollars is greater than the rate of growth of the demand for
dollars. Alternatively it could be argue^ that if the rate of growth
of dollars is greater than the rate of growth of the demand for dollars,
U.S. residents will increase their expenditures on U.S. goods.
11. Note that AA (BB) is not the locus of inflation rates for which the
demand for real dollars (pounds) equals the supply.
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